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Summary
The dialectical inquiry (DI) , the devil's advocate (DA), and the expert
(E) approaches are three potential aids for making decisions under uncertainty.
This study examines the comparative effectiveness of these aids. Furthermore,
an objective, nonemotional DA (DA ) is differentiated from an emotional,
"carping-critic" DA (DA^) . Results indicate that when the state of the world
conforms to the assum.ptaons underlying a plan, the E approach is found to be
superior to the DI approach. When the state of the world :s opposite to the
assumptions in the plan, the DA and DI are superior to the E approach. When
the state of the world is midway between the assumptions of the plan and counter-
plan, the DA^ is superior to both the DI and the E approaches. The results
provide support for the recommendation to use an objective, nonemotional DA
approach in actual decision-making situations.

Effects of the Expert, Devil's Advocate, and
Dialectical Inquiry Methods en Prediction Performance
Dialectical inquiry (DI) was proposed as an aid to corporate decision iT^aking
by Mason (1969). Mason, following C. West Churchman's (1971) interpretation of
Hegel, suggested that a dialectical approach to decision making should involve
examining a situation completely and logically from two different and opposing
points of view. First, a prevailing or recommended strategic plan and the
data which were used to derive it are identified. An attempt is made to
identify the assimiptions underlying the plan. Next, a counterplan is
identified which is feasible, politically viable, and generally credible but
which rests on assumptions which are the opposite of those supporting the plan.
A structured debate is then conducted in which those responsible for formulating
strategy hear arguments in support of both the plan and the counterplan. This
debate, in contrast to a traditional management briefing, consists of a forceful
presentation of two opposing plans which rest on different interpretations of
the same organizational data bank.
The DI approach is, according to Mason, distinctly superior to what he
calls the expert (E) approach which is seen as the most common approach to
strategic planning used by business. In this approach members of a planning
department or consultants provide expert advice regarding the plans the
organization should follow. The planners make a study of the organization's
enviroTiment (opportunittes and threats) , its resources (strengths and
weaknesses), its personal values, and its social responsibilities. The result
of this study is a set of planning recommendations which are usually presented
to management in the form of a strategic briefing session. Mason suggests that
the planning recommendations contain hidden assumptions which are very
frequently not communicated to management. This is one of the most critical
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drawbacks to this approach (Mason, 1969, pp. B"06-B407)
.
Another approach tc strategy.' formulation is the Devil's Advocate (DA)
cechnique. Mason (1969) asserts that this approach should be more effective
than the E approach but less effective than the DI approach. In this approach,
a planner appears before the organization's management and advocates a plan
in a manner similar to that of the E method. Management or another planner
then takes the role of an adverse and often carping critic of the plan.
An attempt is made to determine all that is wrong with the plan and to expound
the reasons why the plan should not be adopted. Mason suggests that while this
approach does expose some underlying assumptions, it does so in the context of
what is wrong with them rather than what they should be. It does not serve to
develop a new managerial world view. For this reason, Mason feels that the DI
method should be more helpful in the strategy formulation task than the DA
approach (Mason, 1969, pp. B407-B408).
Previous Research on the Two Strategy Formulation Aids
Until very recently, previous research on the benefits of DI had consisted
of three field studies. In the first of these. Mason (1969) conducted a case
study on "RMK Abrasives." He presented a plan and a counterplan before top
management. The major hypothesis of the study was that the management decision
makers would form a new, encompassing grasp of the planning problem when exposed
to a DI. Mason reports that interview and questionnaire responses from the RMK
managers indicated a favorable disposition toward the DI approach.
Mitroff, Barabba and Kilmann (1977) arranged DI lectures for employees at
the Bureau of the Census in Washington, D.C. After the lecture, the Census
employees were segregated into five relatively homogeneous groups wherein
employees shared agreement on assumptions underlying some of the planning issues.
Each of the groups produced a planning report and one person from each group
was selected to integrate the five reports into a final planning report. The
final version was supposed to represent a synthesis of the various courses of
action developed by each group. Mitroff, et al. . report the participants and
researchers identified several issues in the integrated plan as exciting and
innovative.
Laurenco and Glidewell (197A) used a DI to explain a conflict situation
between a local television station and its corporate headquarters. The local
station desired autonomous local operations and the headquarters desired close
control. The resolution of this conflict reportedly led to a synthesis that
involved a constructive change in the base of power. Laurenco and Glidewell
(197A, p. 503) conclude "The trend of the synthesis was away from legitimate
power and its coercive supplement and toward identification and expertise."
Thus, the three field studies do provide some support for the assertion that
the dialectical approach is perceived as effective by those participating in
the planning process in which it is used.
I'Jhile field studies are certainly a valuable first step in examining the
DI, it is necessary to examine DI effects under more controlled conditions.
Inherent in the field studies were a large number of uncontrolled variables
which make it difficult to determine the unique effect of one factor. In
addition, the DI was not directly compared to alternative techniques.
Another line of research (Cosier and Rose, 1977; Cosier, 1978; Cosier,
Ruble and Aplin, 1978; Cosier and Aplin, 1979; Cosier, 1980) attempted to
evaluate the value of conflict and the comparative effectiveness of the DA
and DI approaches in more controlled settings. With the exception of Cosier
and Aplin (1979), these studies dealt with a financial prediction task which
involved uncertainty and "cognitive conflict" (interpretive disagreement).
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In these studies, subjects who were asked to make Dredictions of price 'earnings
ratios, were given cue values of current ratios, inventorv turnover, and debt-
to-equity ratios. These cue values were developed ir. such a way that there
was never a perfect correlation between any of the cue values or any combination
of them and the price/earnings ratio. In other words there was always some
uncertainty built into the prediction task.
Using a laboratory paradigm Cosier and Rose (1977) examined the effects of
conflict on decision quality. Subjects were trained to make predictions of
price/earnings ratios for a fictitious company using three cue dimensions.
The cue disimensions consisted of three pieces of financial data. Cue #1 was
the current ratio, Cue ?!'2 was the inventory turnover, and Cue ^-3 was the debt-
to-equity ratio for the fictitious company. One group was given feedback
during training to foster heaviest reliance on cue #1, moderate reliance on
cue #2, and minimal reliance on cue #3. The other group of subjects was
trained in the opposite manner—heaviest reliance on cue /''3, moderate reliance
on cue it2, and least reliance on cue /-l. After training, both groups of subjects
were exposed to another decision maker. Unknown to the subjects, this other
decision maker was programmed to agree with the training policy experienced by
the first group of subjects. Thus, during the prediction phase following
training, one group of subjects in the low cognitive conflict condition
interpreted cue information similar to a counterpart, while a second group in
a high cognitive conflict condition interpreted cue information highly
divergent from a counterpart. During the initial state of the after-training
prediction phase (which involved equally weighted cues for maximum, accuracy)
,
subjects in the high cognitive conflict condition made significantly better
predictions (less error) than subjects in the low cognitive conflict condition.
Thus, Cosier and Rose may have evidence that the conflict generated bv
-he D^
may in fact De functional.
Since Cosier and Rose (1977) did not directly compare the Dl tc alternative
techniques, further research was needed. One alternative technique that deserved
examination was the devil's advocate (DA). Dale (1975, pp. 113-llA) proposes
"the staff man might act as a devil's advocate, bringing out all the reasons why
the proposal should not be accepted. In that way, the decision maker can at
least be aware of the possible perils, as well as the advantages in any course
proposed to him." Cosier (1978) conducted a study using a controlled paradigm
that allowed a comparison between the DA and DI . Subjects were presented with
planning information from two "experts." In the DA condition, one expert recom-
mended a plan of action and another expert criticized that plan of action. in
the DI condition, one expert recommended an action plan and the other expert
recommended a conflicting counterplan. Subjects made predictions within three
distinct contexts. Unknown to the subjects, the first context was consistent
with the recommendations in the plan, the second context was consistent with a com.-
promise between the plan and the counterplan, and the third context was consistent
with the counterplan. The results indicate the DA method may be preferable tc
the DI. In the third context, subjects in the DA condition predicted significantly
better than subjects in the DI condition. In addition, the DI was not superior tc
the DA in the other two contexts.
Cosier, Ruble, and Aplin (1978) and Cosier (.1980) reported results from, two
controlled studies that cast further doubt on the unqualified merits of the DI.
They found that even though the conflict component of the DI was perceived as more
useful in some instances, in general the DI did not lead to significantly more
accurate predictions when compared to alternative planning approaches.
Finally, a field study by Cosier and Aplin (1979) attempted to evaluate the
comparative effectiveness of the DI , DA, and E approaches at producing
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planning statements. Subjects were planners vithin the United Way of America.
Planners were divided into h groups, each of which was assigned to one of four
treatment conditions—E (expert), DI, DA, and the C (control). A case and a
"planning committee report," dealing with a particular United V.'ay Association,
were mailed to each of the planners in the DI, DA, and E conditions giving a
description, brief analysis of the facts in the case, and a set of specific
recommendations. In the DA condition, a critique of the planning committee
report criticizing its underlying assumptions but suggesting no alternative
course of action was also given to the planners. In the DI condition, rather
than a critique of the planning committee report, the planners received a
counterplan' based on different assumptions than those underlying the report.
In the control condition, the planners received no additional materials
beyond the case.
The planners were then asked to prepare a planning document which included:
1) A statement of the mission that the planners felt was appropriate for this
particular United Way Association.
2) An analysis of the case including:
a) a discussion of the problems and opportunities facing this Association.
b) the reasons for the planners' selection of these particular problems
and opportunities.
3) A set of specific recommendations they felt should be implemented in this
United Way Association.
The subjects' planning documents were evaluated by judges. The judges reported
consistent low ratings for those planners exposed to the DI condition across all
criteria. Furthermore, an examination of the planning reports and the judges'
opinions revealed that the reports of those exposed to the DI condition were
characterized by an excessive lack of risk-taking and an underutilization of United
Inquiry Methods
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Ways's resources
Issues Examined in This Study
The results of the early field work seeir. tc be contradictorv to results of
the work by Cosier and his colleagues. There are a number of possible explanations
for this discrepancy, two of which were examined in the present research.
First, it may be that the way in which the DA critique is presented is
different in the lab studies than in actual organizations. In organizations, the
DA may frequently involve a very strong criticism of the accuracy of the E's
interpretation. In contrast, the DA critique in the controlled studies has been a
rather mild statement that the E's position should be questioned. In the present
research, two separate DA statements were given to the subjects: one was a rather
mild, "objective" DA statement and the other was a strong, "emotional" DA statement.
Second, the use of the DI in the early field work was accompanied by strong
attempts to persuade those using the technique of its value. It may be that
persuasion has a differential effect on the effectiveness of the various techniques.
In the present research, the effects of a persuasive statement about the value of the
techniques was assessed by giving half of the subjects using each technique a
persuasive statement regarding the value of the technique.
This study also attempted to replicate the principal findings in the Cosier
(1978) study. The effectiveness of the objective DA versus the DI in a context
favorable to the counterplan was examined. As we noted earlier. Cosier (1978)
found that the DA was associated with better decisions than the DI in this context.
Also, the effectiveness of the E (an expert recommending a plan) versus alternative
inquiry methods was examined. Surprisingly, Cosier (1978) found no significant
differences between the E and the DA and DI techniques in a context favorable to the
plan. This lack of E superiority is important when coupled with evidence that the
DA may be superior when the counterplan represents reality. Cosier (1978) noted
inquiry Methods
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that in his study the DA approach was never dysfunctional and seemed tc be
helpful in the counterplan-best context. Thus, the DA was recommended over the
E without qualification of context.
Application of the Multiple-Cue Probability Learning Paradigm
The Multiple-Cue Probability Learning Paradigm (MCPLP) was employed to
examine the relative effectiveness of the inquiry methods. In order to attempt
replication of Cosier's (1978) findings, the MCPLP was necessary. In addition,
the MCPLP, which has been used to address a variety of interesting Social
Judgment Theors- concerns (Brehmer, 1976 and 1979; Hammond, 1973; Hammond, Stewart,
Brehmer, and Steinmann, 1975) has some distinct benefits. First, because the
MCPLP is based in the Brunswick Lens Model (Brunswik, 1955), the decision maker is
faced with inferring the values of a "hidden" criterion variable based on cue
information from the environment (Mitroff, 19 74). In addition, the MCPLP allows
the environment to be programmed with uncertainty. Inferring the nature of a
future "state of the world" within an uncertain environment is a central element
of strategic decision making. Mason (1969, p. B403) specifically notes that the
strategic decision maker "is concerned with future states of the world and hence
makes predictions about them.
"
Second, the MCPLP allows objective measures of performance and experimental
control that may reveal differences in the inquiry methods-task relationships.
The inquiry methods are intended as techniques for influencing the cue-utilization
policies of decision makers. If a particular inquiry method is superior in
assisting decision makers to "read" their environments, then this should be
reflected by a high degree of prediction accuracy. 1 As suggested by Brehmer
(1976), the opportunity to examine the task-policy linkage under controlled
conditions is inherent in the MCPLP. In fact, prediction accuracv reflects the
difference between the decision maker's oolicv for using cue information and the
InquirA- Methods
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actual cue-criterion relationships defined by the task.
There are at least two limitations imposed by this application of the
MCPLP. In this study, the MCPLP is onlv relevant for situations that involve
prediction decisions over some period of time. Hence, it cannot be applied tc
"one-shot" decisions. Also, an environment that is random will not allow
specification of cue-criterion probability relationships. Thus, decisions
under total uncertainty are not addressed by this application of the MCPLP.
METHOD
Ninety-six subjects were "run" during a one-week period. Subjects, v.'ho
were undergraduates from two organizational behavior classes, participated in
the experiment in order to satisfy a course requirement. The subjects faced a
series of financial prediction situations. Each situation was defined by three
cue values: the current ratio (x ) ; inventory turnover (x^); and debt-to-equity
ratio (x ) . Each prediction situation required that the subject predict a price/
earnings (P/E) ratio (v ) . As noted bv Cosier and Rose (1977) these financial
' s
labels were chosen because there is no empirical evidence to suggest any different
_a priori importance of the three cues and the labels should induce high subject
involvement in the task. In addition, subjects were told in the written instructions
to learn how to use the data as presented in this study to make their predictions.
All subjects received a packet of materials. Each packet contained written
instructions, planning information, cue cards, and a response sheet. All instruction
and plans were presented in written fonri. Subjects were told they would be
predicting P/E ratios for three independent profit centers within ABC Electronics.
Each profit center involved 20 monthly predictions and each center was to be
treated as an independent operation. Subjects were told they had three sources
of information to aid their predictions. Source one was the financial cue values,
source two was feedback consisting of the correct P/E value after each monthly
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prediction, and source three was planning information provided by staff experts.
Each profit center consisted of a distinct group of 20 index cards 'or cue
cards). Side one contained the three cue values (current ratio, inventory turn-
overn and debt-to-equitv ratio) and side two contained the correct ?/E ratio (v ") .
c'
The cue and criterion values were whole numbers which ranged from 1 through 20.
Subjects were given a response form that contained three columns of 20 spaces for
making monthly predictions. The procedure was explained as:
Starting with the first card in your deck, each monthly prediction
is done as follows:
1. Recall the planning information;
2. Consider the three "cue" values on side 1 of the card;
3. Recall any relevant historical information (after the first
prediction for each profit center you will have historical
information or feedback)
;
4. Record your prediction;
5. Turn the card over and view the correct response;
6. Continue to the next card.
Inquiry Methods
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the four inquiry method condi-
tions. In the E condition subjects were told they would consider information from.
a planning report written by "Expert A." The plan told each subject that based
on Expert A's research primary weight should be placed on the current ratio when
predicting P/E ratios. Subjects were told this opinion was based on "analysis of
past data and the fact that the current ratio incorporates information about cur-
rent assets and current liabilities." Expert A further recommended that a moder-
ate amount of weight be placed on the inventory turnover value and little or no
weight be placed on the debt-to-equity ratio.
Inquirv Methods
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In the DI condition subjects were tcid they would consider infornation fror.
a plan and a conflicting counterplan. The counterplan was preuared bv Ey.uert B
and was in fact a contradiction of the plan prepared by Expert A (the
plan was the same document in all conditions) . The counterplan did not directlv
criticize the plan, but instead was based upon conflicting assumptions. For
example, Expert B stated that his analysis of past data dictated that primary
weight should be placed on the debt-to-equity ratio when predicting P/E ratios.
Expert B recommended moderate weight be placed on the inventory turnover value
and little or no weight be placed on the current ratio. As was the case for
Expert A, Expert B's rationale was based on a description of the three cues and
prior research.
In the DA condition, subjects were given a plan written by Expert A and a
critique of the plan written by "Expert B." The critique questioned the conclu-
sions and assumptions of Expert A but did not offer alternative propositions. For
example, regarding the importance of the current ratio, Expert B noted his analysis
revealed it was questionable to put primary weight on the current ratio and "It is
quite possible that a high correlation may not exist between current ratios and
P/E-ratios." All of the experts in this study were defined in the instructions
as staff assistants employed by ABC Electronics to assist in planning.
Finally, in the DA„ condition, the subjects were given a plan and critique
as in the DA., condition. However, in this condition, the critique was worded much
more strongly and was much more critical of Expert A than was the critique in the
DA- condition. For example, regarding the importance of the current ratio, Expert
B stated, "Expert A's assumption that there should be a high correlation between
known current ratios and future P'E ratios is certaintly not true in all cases
and represents a dangerous overgeneralization which could lead tc errors in pre-
diction."
Inquir>- Methods
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An attempt was made during all manipulations to capture the fundamental pro-
cess defining each inquiry method. For example, the conflict inherent in com.peting
recommendations was deemed the fundamental Dl component (Mason. 1969). The dis-
sent evidenced by a critical opinion was isolated as the key DA component (Mason,
1969).
Persuasion
In addition to being assigned to one of the four inquiry method conditions
each subject was randomly assigned to one of two persuasion conditions. Subjects
in the weak persuasion condition were simply given a statement describing the in-
quiry method. There was no attempt to persuade them of the value of the method.
Subjects in the strong persuasion condition were given a description of the in-
quiry method they were to use as well as a summary of the past uses of the tech-
nique, and its proven value. Finally, subjects in mis "persuasion" condition
were asked to make strong effort to use the technique to improve their predictions.
Context of the Decisions
Unknown to the subjects, the three independent profit centers represented
three different decision-making contexts or "states of the world." State one (SI)
was programmed such that: r = .80, r = .50,and r - . ^0 This srate
l^c ''2^c Vc
was constructed to be in general agreement with the plan offered by Expert A.
Expert A's plan is in fact predicated on assumptions reflected in the .8-. 5-.
2
correlation scheme. Notice world state schemes are "hidden"- from direct view of
the subjects. S3 was created so that r = .20, r =
. 50 and r := "0
Thus S3 was in essential agreement with the assumptions and recommendations in the
counterplan. A "compromise" state was represented by S2. The cue weights in ?2
were created so that all three cues would be of equal importance: r
^^1^'c
^x V
~ •^^> 3'^<^
^x V
~
-55. Since mult icollinearity was near zero, the coeffi-
-2'c Vr
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2
cient of determination (R^ ) in all wcrld states v.-'as r^rin-arilv deterr.ined b'- theXV • •
• c
^
3
,
three cue-criterion correlation schemes in each world state (R~ - I r~
x>- c ,• _ - ^ • y „
2
" 1-- 1- c
In all three world states R_ - .88. Notice unexplained error variance (ranccr-.-
'" c
ness) was present in all states of the world.
In order to prevent confounding world states with sequence, the states i:cre
assigned from a latin squares scheme. This created a between-subj ects factor that
will be called "order," Order consists of three conditions: SI, S2, S5; S3, SI,
b^^ b2, bj, J A. ,
Dependent Measure
The dependent measure used to assess prediction accuracy is the average abso-
lute error for each world state (i,e, —' ^ - where v is the subject's predic-20 " S J r
tion and y represents the criterion value per month) , This measure was used bv
^ c
Cosier and Rose (1977), and Cosier (1978 and 1980) as an indicator of prediction oer-
formance. In order to avoid some difficulties associated with absolute measures
all subjects considered the same cue values in each state of the world. In
addition, all subjects were told this measure was t'ne criterion for performance.
Although this dependent variable has the advanta^^e of being an "objective"
performance measure, some information is admittedly "lost" within each block of
20 predictions. Unfortunately, we cannot break the 20 trials into smaller blocks
and maintain equal and comparable sets of cue-criterion relationships. The
"correct" answers, which invqlve some error due to uncertainty, are based on a 20
trial constraint. The total number of predictions in the study (60), however,
were broken into 3 sets of 20 to allow some insi£ht into performance effects over
time.
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RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
In order to determine if the subjects seemed to read the planning informa-
tion, an item on the post-task questionnaire asked which cue dimension that Expert
A recommended be highly emphasized. Four specific possibilities (current ratio,
inventory turnover, debt-to-equity ratio, and P/E ratio!) and an "I don't know"
choice were available. Ninety-nine percent of the subjects provided the correct
response (the current ratio). The subjects were also asked if they treated each
profit center as independent of the others. Seventy-five percent agreed or strongly
agreed with the statement that the profit centers were independent (S% were neutral)
Thus the vast majority of subjects were able to recall E>rpert A's primary recom-
mendations and reported treating the profit centers as independent units.
An item on the post-task questionnaire asked whether the subjects perceived
a strong attempt at persuasion. A continuous 10 cm., line was anchored by "Yes,
a strong attempt" and "No, no attempt." Subjects in the persuasion condition re-
ported a significantly stronger attempt (F = 7.73, p < .01) than subjects in the
no-persuasion condition.
Finally, subjects were asked to circle the statement that described the in-
formation that they received from the expert (s). Five choices were available
—
1) Two divergent and conflicting sets of recommendations; 2) Two different but
non-conflicting sets of recommendations; 3) One set of recommendations and a
critique; A) One set of recommendations and a supportive statement; and 5) A
single set of recommendations. Seventy-nine percent of the DI subjects picked 1),
Inquin.- Methods
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and 88? of the E subjects picked 'j) or 5*. Interestingly, v.'hile bl','-. of the DA
subjects selected 2) or 3), onlv 37% of the DA^ subiects selected 2) or 3).
Sixty-three percent of the DA^ subjects selected 1) as best describing their
information. These data show that the perceptions of the experts' information
2
did vary, depending upon the inquiry method CX. = 93.0, p < .001). Furthermore,
the most frequent reports of "conflicting recommendations" were present in the DI
and DA„ conditions.
Prediction Performance
A four-factor ANOVA consisting of three between-sub jects factors (inquiry
method, persuasion, and order) and one within-subjects factor (context) was used
to analyze the performance data for the subjects.
Table 1 shows that a context X inquiry method interaction (F = 5.39, p < .01)
as well as a context X order interaction (F = 5.06, p < . 01) were present . These
interactions required simple-effects analyses for interpretation.
Insert Table 1 Here
Regarding the inquiry method X context interaction, significant inquiry
method effects were found for each context. The Duncan multiple range technique
revealed that within the si context (plan best) the subjects exposed to the E
inquiry method predicted significantly better (p < .05) than those exposed to the
DI (see Table 2 for the mean absolute error values). Within the S^ context (coun-
terplan best) the subjects exposed to the DA and DI predicted significantly bette:
(p < .01) than subjects exposed to the E inquiry method. Within the S(^ context
(compromise between the plan and counterplan) the superiority of the subiects
exposed to the DA over the DI and the E inquiry methods was significant at the
.05 level.
Insert Table 2 Here
As noted earlier, a context X order interaction was also found. Significant
simple effects were found for contexts at each order. Using the Duncan multi-
ple range technique, subjects using Order 1 (SI. S2. S3) predicted significantly
better in S3 than either SI or S2 (p < .01). In Order 2, (S3, SI, S2) Drediction
error was significantly less in S2 than in S3 (p < .01) and less in SI than S3
(p < .01). In Order 3, (S2, S3, SI) prediction error was significantly less in
SI than in S2 or S3 (p < .01 and .05 respectively). In addition, subjects pre-
dicted significantly better in S3 than S2 (p < .01).
These data suggest subjects improved their predictions over time. In order
to verify this possibility, a supplementary analysis was run examining "sequence"
(position of context over time) as a within-subjects factor. This analysis re-
vealed a sequence main effect (F = 9.97, p < .01). This effect reflected predic-
tion improvements (at .01) between each set of 20 predictions over time. '-
DISCUSSION
The conclusions from the present study are basically consistent with those of
the earlier work by Cosier and his colleagues. In this study, there was a signi-
ficant context X order interaction as well as a significant context X inquiry
method interaction. The context X order interaction and the subsequent examination
of "sequence" demonstrates that the subjects were able to improve their prediction
performances over time.
The context X inquiry method interaction, and subsequent analysis, suggest
that in situations in which" an expert's plan reflects the true state of the world,
the DI technique is actually detrimental to prediction performance. In this case,
simply giving individuals the expert's analysis and plan is likely to lead to
more accurate prediction performances than giving individuals DI information.
Inquiry Methods
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Interestingly, this superiority of the E approach ever the DI ir. SI was not
found by Cosier (1978).
It is important to note, however that the E method was not significantly superior
to either DA technique in SI. This finding, which is consistent with results in
Cosier (1978), suggests that the DA approach may not impair decision caking under
the plan-best condition.
When the expert's plan represents the opposite cf the true state of affairs.
both the "objective" DA (DA ) and the DI methods of presenting planning inforrr.a-
tion may be superior to the E approach. Thus, the conflict introduced by both
methods is apparently helpful in situations where the true state of the world is
quite different from the assumptions with the expert's plan.
Finally, when the true state of the world is midway between the assumptions
contained in the expert's plan and those contained in the counterplan, the objec-
tive DA method (DA.) may be superior to both the E and the DI approaches;
Mason (1969) has criticized the DA approach on the grounds that it involves
simply the criticism of a plan with no suggestions of alternative plans. It may
be that this feature of the DA approach is actually a strength rather than a
weakness. Planners faced with two contradictory sets of analysis and recommenda-
tions may in fact be tempted to make a choice between them, either fully accepting
the assumptions underlying the plan or the counterplan. When the plan represents
the true state of the world this would explan why the E approach is superior to the
DI. The DI approach may lead some subjects to initially choose the counterplan
which would lead to poorer prediction performance. KTien the plan represents the
opposite of the true state of the world, however, the subjects' choice of the
counterplan would lead to superior prediction performance, explaining why the DI
approach may be superior to the E approach in this situation.
Inquiry- Ilethods
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The DA approach, on the other hand, does not encourage a planner tc make a
choice between two contradictory plans. Rather, it encourages the planner to
examine the assumptions underlying the expert's plan. Subjects using this approach
might have a greater tendency to develop assumptions based on data fron the environ-
ment rather than accepting the assumptions of either a plan or a counterplan. This
would help to explain why, in a situation in which the state of the world conforms
to neither the plan nor the counterplan, the DA technique was found to be superior
to both the E and the DI approaches.
These data provide some support for a point made by Mason (1959). He sug-
gested "that a potential problem with the DA is that it may be perceived by decision
makers as an overly negative, carping kind of criticism and that this perception
may reduce the effectiveness of the DA. In this study, the DA • critique was worded
as a reasonably objective, unemotional statement while the DA^ did have elements
of carping criticism. The DA^ ' s failure to be associated with superior performances
when compared to the DI and E indicates that this strong emotional condition may
be detrimental to the effectiveness of the DA in some circumstances. This leads
to the suggestion that when the DA is used, care should be taken to avoid the nega-
tive, carping sort of criticism Mason (1969) condemns.
This study provides evidence that the relationship between the task and the
inquiry method is crucial. When comparing the E and the DI, this study suggests the
"best" method is unclear. In SI, the task is best-matched with the E technique.
In S3, however, the task is best-matched with the DI. Since it is difficult to
specify the context before the decision is made, the choice between E and DI is
problematic. The "objective" DA, however, has not been significantly inferior
to the E in SI. In addition, it has been significantly more helpful than the E
and DI techniques in other contexts. Thus, over all contexts, the DA approach
appears to be at least as good, or better than the alternative inquiry methods.
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It can also be argued that due to the uncertainly generally associated vith
organizational decision making, it is reasonable to suspect that the assumptions
underlying the plan will not all be correct. Nor is it likely that all of the
assumptions underlying the counterplan will be correct. In many decision
situations, the true state of the world may lie somewhere between the plan and
the counterplan, the situation in which the objective DA was shown to be superior
in the study.
Interestingly, the persuasion factor had little effect on prediction perfor-
mance. Telling subjects that a technique was useful did not result in increased
objective performance. Criticisms of previous controlled studies suggesting the
results are of limited generalizability because of a lack of an indoctrination
program may be unwarranted.
Of course, one can argue that the operationalizations of the factors in this
study do not accurately represent the "real-world" inquiry methods. This possi-
bility, which is characteristic of any controlled study, suggests the need for
future research using a variety of paradigms before the DI is offered to prac-
titioners as an aid for making corporate decisions. Case studies and field
experiments may prove helpful. These methods, however, may lack the control
over confounding factors and clear performance measures available from laboratory
designs. Continuing research into the DI may help us decide whether models,
such as "Strategic Assumptions Analysis" (Mitroff and Emshoff, 1979) that assume
the validity of the DI, are premature. It may be that an objective, factual-
based DA component should be offered in lieu of a DI component in strategv models.
Incuir>' Methods
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FOOTNOTES
Inferences about inquiry method differences, of course, require randoni
assignment and common task situations across subjects.
Sequence is merely a reordering of the contexts (when required) in temporal
order. Sequence was not run at the same time V7ith the context factor because of
the lack of independence between the two factors. A sequence X context interaction,
therefore, makes little sense given the nature of the factors.
Table 1
ANOVA for Prediction Performance
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Source df MS
Subjects
Inquiry Method (B)
Persuasion (C)
Order (D)
B X C
B X D
C X D
B X C X D
Error (Between)
Within
Context (A)
A X B
A x C
A X D
A X B X C
A X B X D
A X C X D
A X B X C X D
Interaction
Total
95
3
1
2
3
6
2
6
72
192
2
6
2
A
6
12
4
12
144
287
1.05
2.10
0.20
2.95
0.27
1.76
.97
.60
.98
.37
.16
1.65
.15
1.55
.32
. .43
.22
.20
.31
.60
2.18
.20
3.00
.27
1.79
.99
.61
.51
5.39*
.50
5.06*
1.05
1.42
.73
.66
.01
Table 2
Inquiry Method and Order Mean Absolute
Error Values at Each Context
Inquirv Methods
Inquiry Method Order
Context DI
°*i DA^
E J-
-,
< ^
J
SI 2.98 2.56 2.72 2.41 2.70 2.58 2.72
S2 2.91 2.38 2.76 2.91 2.65 2.46 3.12
S3 2.54 2.45 2.77 3.16
1
2.43 2.86 i
1
2.90




